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CHAPTER 2 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion : Reading the 
Low in light of the High * 
Steven Frankel 
Strauss’s early studies of Spinoza, including his first book, Spinoza’s 
Critique of Religion (1930; henceforth SCR ), have been largely neglected 
in favor of his later work. Such neglect is understandable: Strauss’s work 
on Spinoza spans his entire career as a scholar and thinker, and includes his 
discovery of esotericism—which played a critical role in his most authoritative 
analysis of Spinoza. In addition, Strauss privately conceded problems with 
the work. In a letter to Gerhard Kr ü ger in 1930, Strauss conceded that he had 
been compelled to remain silent in public about the presuppositions that were 
the point of departure for SCR . 1 Later he criticized the work publicly for not 
taking seriously the possibility of return to premodern philosophy (¶¶21, 42). 
It is somewhat surprising then that more than 30 years later, after its publication 
in German, Strauss decided to have the book translated into English. 
Ostensibly to explain his decision, Strauss prefaces the translation with an 
autobiographical account of the genesis and development of his early views as 
well as the inclusion of a later essay on Carl Schmitt (1932). One can recognize 
many of the themes in SCR —for example, the tension between Athens and 
Jerusalem, the inadequacy of the Enlightenment’s critique of religion, and the 
development of Epicureanism, and others—which would preoccupy Strauss 
over the course of his career. Still, Strauss’s decision to resurrect this early 
work is puzzling. 
The studied carelessness with which Strauss handles his autobiographical 
account is in striking contrast to the attention he pays to the substance of the 
preface. This becomes clear when we contrast the literary form of the essay with 
the substantive argument: The literary form is an autobiographical narrative of a 
young German Jew who seeks to escape the “theological-political predicament” by 
either returning to the form of Jewish belief or else discovering a political alternative, 
such as Zionism or liberalism (see ¶¶1–13). After pointing to the difficulties 
with both of these political alternatives, Strauss seeks a qualified return to Jewish 
belief mediated by modern thought (see ¶¶14–23). When this proves unworkable, 
 
9781137324382_04_cha02.indd 33 10/30/2013 7:07:36 PM 
34 ● Steven Frankel 
he considers the return to “unqualified Jewish belief ” or orthodoxy. This leads him 
to consider Spinoza’s critique of Judaism, and this is presumably the context within 
which SCR was written (see ¶¶24–39). Ultimately, Strauss concludes that Spinoza’s 
critique undermines not only Judaism but also philosophy, and he decides to return 
to “Jewish medieval rationalism and its classical (Aristotelian and Platonic) foundation” 
(see ¶¶40–42). 
This straightforward account of his intellectual development is undermined by 
the substance of his argument. Toward the center of his essay, Strauss confounds 
the account of his development. 2 For example, as a young man, Strauss reports that 
he was still considering the possibility of return to Jewish thought as mediated by 
modern rationalism, particularly in the thought of Franz Rosenzweig. According 
to his autobiographical narrative, he has not yet considered the possibility of return 
to premodern forms of rationalism, and in fact would not do so until after the completion 
of SCR . This is the conclusion of his autobiographical account: “I began 
therefore to wonder whether the destruction of reason was not the outcome of 
modern rationalism, as distinguished from pre-modern rationalism” (¶42). 
However, in ¶21 Strauss breaks dramatically from the autobiographical narrative 
to assert the conclusion of the autobiographical account. After he criticizes 
Rosenzweig’s new thinking, he writes: “One begins to wonder whether our medieval 
philosophy, and the old thinking of Aristotle, of which it made use, was not 
more ‘empirical’ . . . than an unqualified empiricism” (¶21). In effect, Strauss has 
moved the conclusion of the autobiography to the middle of the argument. This 
casts doubt on the central claim of the autobiography, which presents Strauss as 
gradually discovering the inadequacy of modern reason and the relevance of the 
ancients. Even if we read this claim as merely an aside or parenthetical remark so 
that it does not disturb the overall narrative, it is difficult to deny that Strauss is 
more concerned with emphasizing his conclusions than with giving an account or 
exploring the historical development of his thought. 3 Throughout the essay, he 
presents several more examples of interrupting the narrative to emphasize mature 
judgments that, though they shape his account, emerge only after the biographical 
period portrayed in the essay. One example, which we shall discuss in greater detail 
below, is Strauss’s hermeneutical maxim of reading the low in light of the high 
(¶7). This principle supersedes the autobiographical narrative in terms of shaping 
the content of the essay. Strauss’s goal is not to encourage further reflection upon 
his autobiography or offer an account of his intellectual development, but rather to 
guide our attention toward his mature thought. 
The Theologico-Political Problem 
Strauss begins the preface by referring to himself as “a young Jew born and raised in 
Germany who found himself in the grips of the theologico-political predicament.” 4 
Unfortunately, Strauss does not explain the nature of the theologico-political predicament, 
or indicate what specifically about the predicament constrained him. 
This is less of a mystery than it appears since the preface itself is devoted to explaining 
how to read Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforth TTP ), which 
in term is intended as an introduction to Strauss first book on the same topic. In 
order to see what is at issue, it is useful therefore to remind ourselves of the main 
themes of the theologico-political predicament as presented by Spinoza. 
The TTP begins with an account of the role of superstition in political life. 
The perdurance of superstition creates a theological problem because men imagine 
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a divine source to explain their fortunes, and it also creates a political problem 
because religious and political leaders are eager to manipulate them in order to 
solidify their own power. 5 Spinoza focuses on the particular theologico-political 
problem in Christendom and asks his readers to consider why Christians preach 
love and practice hatred (P.4.1–2). He goes on to suggest that Christianity has been 
hijacked and vulgarized by unscrupulous men who pervert its teachings in order 
to satisfy their ambitions for the wealth and power of ecclesiastical offices. Among 
their most insidious methods for obscuring and twisting the word of God is the 
importation of foreign or superstitious ideas into the Bible, particularly “the theories 
of Aristotelians and Platonists” (P.4.7). 6 Spinoza’s account assumes that reason 
can identify superstition because reason can in principle provide a full account of 
nature; nonetheless, philosophy is unable to adjudicate disputes among superstitious, 
passionate individuals. To the contrary, philosophy is quickly transformed 
into yet another instrument to bolster superstition. The power of superstition also 
poses a political problem, because as superstitions gain in intensity, the passions 
that accompany them also increase and threaten the stability of the state. 
The theologico-political predicament refers to the superstitious condition of 
mankind and the subsequent manipulation of those superstitions by religious and 
political leaders. Spinoza’s solution to the problem has both political and theological 
elements. Theologically, he distinguishes the essential teachings of Christianity 
so that they can be purged of superstition, and restored in authority. The essential 
teaching of the Bible, and the minimum requirement for salvation, is the practice 
of charity and love toward all men. With her foundations restored, Christianity 
can once again contribute to the peacefulness of society. These few dogmas of 
Christianity do not exhaust our knowledge of God. Some men may seek and 
achieve greater knowledge of God; however, such knowledge is not a theological 
or political requirement for salvation. Politically, the pursuit of this knowledge is 
irrelevant since it is available to only a few individuals (14.1.49–51). The state needs 
only to secure safety and security for its citizens. For the most part, it leaves the 
citizens free to pursue knowledge of God as they see fit—as long as that pursuit 
is consistent with caritas . Spinoza envisions freedom, rather than reason or virtue, 
as the cornerstone of political life with the hope that reason will flourish under 
such conditions. 7 Strauss describes this regime as liberal democracy, and identifies 
Spinoza as its founder. 8 
The general analysis of the theologico-political predicament, directed toward a 
larger Christian audience, was not the same problem faced by Strauss, “a young Jew 
in Germany.” The version that Strauss inherited reflected the success of Spinoza’s 
political solution in Germany, as well as its particular reception in the Jewish community. 
Spinoza’s analysis was attractive to German Jews for several reasons: First, 
Spinoza himself was born a Jew and his argument involves a deep knowledge of 
Jewish commentaries on the Hebrew Bible. Strauss writes that many of his contemporaries 
in the Jewish community celebrated Spinoza “on purely Jewish grounds” 
(¶¶28, 26). Second, Spinoza’s solution to the theologico-political predicament provides 
for a society where both Jews and Christians can live together in freedom 
despite differences in their private beliefs. Strauss reports that many German Jews 
believed that, thanks to Spinoza, “the millennial antagonism between Judaism 
and Christianity was about to disappear” (¶27). The reason for this confidence is 
that Spinoza had shown Jews that their religious law was purely political, and as a 
result, had become obsolete with the destruction of the Jewish state. This provided 
the theological argument for assimilation. Third, Spinoza’s analysis of the Jews in 
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Chapter three of the TTP not only envisions Jews and Christians living together but 
also considers the possibility that Jews might rebuild their former state. Certainly, 
this argument was meant to complement his analysis of the destruction of the 
Jewish state and not as a political strategy; nonetheless, Spinoza was celebrated by 
some Jews as the founder of Zionism (cf. ¶11). 
Strauss was in the grips of the theologico-political predicament as described 
by Spinoza. The various solutions that Spinoza suggests, namely secular liberalism, 
religious liberalism, and Zionism, appear to be the only options available to 
the young Strauss. The organization of the essay adopts the framework set out 
by Spinoza, considering each possibility in turn. As we shall see, each solution 
falls short and the thread connecting these failures is the audacious confidence in 
the power and capacity of reason to recognize and redress superstition. Spinoza’s 
solutions are political solutions to the problem of superstition since they concede 
that most people will remain superstitious; nonetheless, they offer strategies for 
prudently managing superstition. By framing the issue in this way, as a matter of 
reason ameliorating superstition, Spinoza suggests the political value of religion for 
a stable community, while undermining the philosophical basis for revelation. The 
result is that we are left with only unpalatable options. After turning to Spinoza’s 
solutions to the theological political problem, Strauss next considers the modern 
variants of Spinoza’s analysis, Heidegger’s atheism, and Rosenzweig’s piety. Both 
fail to resolve the tension between politics, religion, and philosophy: either we 
reject reason and embrace revelation, or else we reject revelation and, with it, the 
well-being of our political communities. 
Liberalism in Weimar 
Strauss reports that the majority of German Jews celebrated Weimar and its historical 
founder, Spinoza. Although Weimar originated with the defeat of Germany and 
his humiliation in the Treaty of Versailles, she could trace her roots to a nobler, 
deeper heritage in the French Revolution, and ultimately Spinoza’s account of the 
theological-political problem. From their point of view, liberal democracy had deep 
roots in Germany so that their Jewish faith presented no obstacle to assimilation. 
They interpreted Weimar in the best or highest light, emphasizing its moderate 
character and its attempt to integrate the “principles of 1789” with the “highest 
German tradition” (¶2). This tradition includes the recognition of the rights of 
man and a well-organized government of highly trained civil servants. Under this 
regime, Jews flourished and participated in the cultural life of the Republic, and 
Jewish life was strong; it even developed a new “science of Judaism” (¶7). Although 
the German tradition also included strong anti-Jewish sentiments that dominated 
medieval society, liberalism corrected this situation by protecting the rights of religious 
minorities and purging the government of superstitious and irrational goals. 
No wonder Weimar appeared to German Jews all the more precious and noble. 9 
In direct contrast to this view, the Zionists, with whom Strauss openly sided, 
viewed Weimar as weak at its very foundations and unable to defend itself when 
challenged by ruthless enemies who viewed the Jews as outsiders who threatened 
German Kultur with foreign culture and “ Civilisation .” 10 Strauss presents quotations 
from Goethe, Nietzsche, and Heidegger that demonstrate the resilience of 
anti-Jewish feelings in Germany (¶8). Ignoring their “precarious situation,” the 
Jews of Weimar clung to the vain hope that liberalism would somehow prevail. 
Strauss suggests that the election of Hindenburg in 1925 “showed everyone who had 
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eyes to see that the Weimar Republic had only a short time to live,” because the nonliberal 
tradition was “stronger in will” (¶3, emphasis added, S.F.). Strauss’s phrase 
suggests that the weakness and vulnerability of Weimar were obvious, yet few, 
particularly within the Jewish community, recognized it. The problem of superstition 
comes to light in the first instance as the belief in the durability of liberalism 
in Weimar. 
History appears to have vindicated this Zionist critique of German Jewry. 
Weimar is likely to be remembered as a cautionary tale of democracy without 
strength, “of justice without a sword” (¶3). However, the Zionist vision was also 
limited by the fact it is the product of the liberalism that it criticizes, rather than 
of the Jewish tradition (cf. ¶11). The difficulty of making a balanced judgment 
on Weimar is that it requires measuring the low elements against the higher ones. 
Strauss suggests the following rule of thumb: “It is safer to understand the low in 
the light of the high than the high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one 
necessarily distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the 
low of the freedom to reveal itself fully as what it is” (¶5). 11 To judge Weimar only 
on its sorry record of weakness and collapse ignores its deeper and nobler roots and 
“its moderate, non-radical character” (¶2). As a principle of interpretation, taking 
one’s bearings from the highest rather than the lowest possibilities seems to be a 
prudent rule of thumb. 
But this principle is hardly self-evident. Strauss’s justification of this principle 
on the grounds of safety raises the question: safer for whom? In the context of the 
preface, where Strauss discusses repeatedly the “precarious” situation of the Jews in 
Weimar and Europe, the primary consideration appears to be the safety of the Jews 
in the Diaspora (¶¶6–8). His subsequent analysis highlights the dangers involved 
in ignoring the lowest political elements in favor of dreams about perpetual peace. 
He takes a particularly severe view of Hermann Cohen’s faith in progress and his 
unwillingness to confront the less palatable side of power and coercion in politics 
(cf. ¶¶32–33). Cohen was so concerned with interpreting the high in light of 
the low that he underplayed the reality of the low. He condemned Spinoza “for 
his Machiavellian-inspired hard-heartedness” only to fall victim to “the opposite 
extreme” (¶32). But even Cohen appears to be a sober realist compared to the “fantastic 
flights” that mesmerized those German Jews who feted Spinoza as a savior 
(¶29). Strauss openly sides with the Zionists’ interpretation of the Jewish Question, 
a position that confirms the wisdom of neglecting the high in politics in order to 
protect oneself from the low. Nonetheless, as we shall see, his analysis ultimately 
reveals the serious flaws with its neglect of the high. 
Zionism as a Political Solution to the “Jewish Problem” 
Spinoza inspired the Zionist movement by suggesting that there is a political solution 
to the Jewish problem, which involves giving priority to politics over religion. 12 
In his critique of purely political Zionism, Strauss draws our attention to the work 
of Ahad Ha‘am (Asher Ginsberg, 1856–1927), “the founder of cultural Zionism.” 
For Ahad Ha‘am, the theological questions had been already settled by Darwin 
and science, both of which had allegedly proven that revelation was false (¶15). 
This distinction helps to understand Strauss’s critique, specifically how Zionism 
was largely correct in its analysis of liberalism in Germany and yet not able to 
offer Jews a completely satisfying account of Judaism. In addition, this analysis of 
a political solution that is theologically inadequate casts the theologico-political 
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problem in sharper relief. The political situation of the Jews involves questions of 
power and safety as well as theoretical questions about the meaning of Judaism. To 
read the low in light of the high means to judge political solutions in light of their 
higher, theoretical considerations. Strauss’s analysis shows that, while it is dangerous 
to ignore practical political concerns, they need to be separated from the higher 
theological questions. His critique of both the Zionists and the assimilationists 
confirms this reading. 
While Zionism has the virtue of grasping the limitations of liberalism in Europe 
(cf. ¶6), it does not reject liberalism itself. Instead it attributes the failure of liberalism 
to the fact that the Jews were at the mercy of other nations. Strauss quotes 
Herzl on the failure of assimilation: “We are a nation—the enemy makes us a 
nation whether we like it or not” (¶10). The assimilationists abandon Judaism in 
the vain hope that they will be welcomed into a universal society. Political Zionism 
exposes the fact that liberalism, despite its promise of a universal solution to the 
Jewish Question, cannot create a view of justice strong enough to overcome discrimination. 
Liberalism cannot eliminate hatred or superstition; at best, it can provide 
only legal—rather than social—equality. But Strauss does not stop there. He 
argues that Zionism also betrays Judaism in the belief that it can resolve the Jewish 
Question by treating it merely as a problem of power, not divine punishment. 
The virtue of Zionism was its sober claim that the Jewish Question could be 
solved by power alone. Even cultural Zionism attempts to combine this view with 
a project for the revival of Judaism, but its account of the high is vague and unsatisfying. 
As a result, cultural Zionism tends to slide in opposite directions, “politics 
(power politics) and divine revelation” (¶12). This result follows from Spinoza’s 
account of the Jewish Question. Cultural Zionism attempts to escape the theological- 
political grip of Spinoza, but it cannot explain the basis of the high; instead it 
either ignores the high in the case of political Zionism or reads the high in light of 
the low in the case of cultural Zionism. 
The Highest Goals of Political Life 
Strauss exposes the failure of Zionism to resolve the Jewish Question as part of a 
broader critique of liberalism. Following Spinoza, liberalism advocated the separation 
of politics from religion on the grounds that such a separation would allow 
politics to pursue more effectively the goals of safety and security. 13 By focusing 
on the low, liberalism promised to leave people the freedom to pursue the high in 
safety. The problem is that this freedom also allows for superstition, and thus liberalism 
does not solve the problem of discrimination. To do so, liberalism would have 
to prevent discrimination by severely limiting freedom of speech in both the public 
and the private sphere. This would, in effect, destroy the private sphere and, with 
it, the raison d’ être for the liberalism. The Zionists recognized that the problem 
of superstition, and more particularly of anti-Jewish beliefs, was not resolved by 
freedom of thought in the private sphere. To the contrary, prejudice against Jews 
seemed to spread all the more widely in liberal democracies. Liberalism cannot 
resolve the Jewish problem, or more generally the problem of the imagination in 
political life. In Strauss’s words, the Jewish Question is an example of an “infinite, 
absolute problem [which] cannot be solved” (¶12). 
The claim that there are permanent problems shifts our attention from the particular 
perspective of a young Jew in Weimar toward a broader understanding of 
the limits of liberalism. The Jewish Question is one example of neglecting the high 
 
9781137324382_04_cha02.indd 38 10/30/2013 7:07:37 PM 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion ● 39 
to manage the low. By allowing superstitious men freedom of thought, liberalism 
contributes willy-nilly to the decline of philosophy and reason in political life. 
Strauss again breaks from the autobiographical chronology with a judgment that 
shapes the narrative. As with his claim about judging the lower in light of the 
higher, he forces us to consider the claim more carefully and reflect on the role 
of reason in political life. The Jewish problem is “the most manifest symbol” of 
the political dimension of the “human problem,” which cannot be fully resolved 
(¶12). He contrasts this with the problem of the Jewish individual who has become 
alienated from his faith. This problem can be resolved by rejoining the Jewish community. 
However, the larger problem of the Jewish community’s relation to other, 
nonJewish communities cannot be resolved. Liberalism tries to resolve it by finding 
a common understanding of justice or “a universal human society,” which is united 
by its vision of justice (¶14). 
Strauss presents the liberal solution as it appeared to his contemporaries, namely 
that liberalism was the best solution to the Jewish problem either because Judaism 
itself had been refuted (¶14) or because liberalism simply followed from Jewish 
principles of justice (¶28). Spinoza provides the basis for both claims since his 
argument is built on the dual premises of criticizing the Biblical teaching while 
returning to its essential principle, the practice of charity. 14 The principle of charity 
and toleration has the advantage of a broad consensus among various religious 
faiths and even nonbelievers. For adherents of the Bible, Spinoza argues that the 
truest and most accurate reading of the Bible reveals that its deepest teaching, the 
one most necessary for salvation, is the practice of caritas . For all good men— - 
honestos as Spinoza calls them—the benefits of this religious view are so apparent 
that they would embrace it just as enthusiastically whether or not they are believers 
( TTP 14.1.36). 15 In addition, by subordinating all other religious beliefs to charity, 
liberalism allows a good deal of freedom of thought. Any views, even atheism, are 
acceptable if they promote charity. 16 
The Question of Return 
In his critique of Weimar and Zionism, Strauss had cast a doubt on whether 
Spinoza’s strategy of accommodating all views can work effectively without identifying 
a firmer theoretical basis for the morality of caritas . He concludes that 
“the Jewish problem is insoluble,” by which he means that the “liberal state cannot 
provide a solution to the Jewish problem” (¶13). Strauss qualifies this claim 
by admitting that liberalism is better than the alternatives of communism and 
National Socialism, and that it does provide an “uneasy ‘solution to the Jewish 
problem’” (¶13). Then, in striking contrast to his previous claims, he declares in 
the next paragraph: “There is a Jewish problem that is humanly soluble” (¶14). This 
problem, however, is not the wider political problem of the community in a precarious 
situation, but rather of “the problem of the Western Jewish individual.” The 
individual can return to traditional beliefs and avoid the illusions of liberalism. In 
this sense, there is hope for solving our “deepest problem” and “most vital need” 
theoretically, even if this does not end discrimination or superstition (¶14). 
In moving from the political situation to the question of individual return, 
Strauss has not entirely freed himself from the grips of the theologico-political 
predicament. Although he has explained why a political solution cannot fully solve 
the Jewish problem, he has not yet exposed the theoretical underpinnings of liberalism. 
These underpinnings are first revealed when Strauss points out that “some 
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of his contemporaries” believed that return was impossible because the traditional 
faith “had been overthrown once and for all.” But the theoretical legacy of liberalism 
is more complicated than simply rejecting revelation. This is indicated by the 
fact that many more of Strauss’s contemporaries believed that it was possible to 
grant science and history complete authority “without abandoning one iota of the 
substance of the Jewish faith” (¶15). In short, the theologico-political predicament 
is ambiguous: does it destroy faith or preserve it? In the next section of the essay, 
Strauss examines the reasons for this ambiguity. As we shall see, both positions are 
the result of a deliberate ambiguity about the status of Scripture within Spinoza’s 
argument. As Strauss frees himself of Spinoza’s theologico-political grip, he parts 
company with more of his contemporaries. 
The path Strauss follows takes him through the intellectual currents of his time. 
I emphasize that he follows this path, which he describes as a “qualified return” 
or a return mediated by modernity, because it has already been marked out by its 
founders including Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig as “new thinking.” As the 
very title of the movement, “new thinking,” indicates, the movement represented 
a conscious departure from the tradition so that the question of return takes on a 
radical new meaning. The new thinking has several elements that interested Strauss 
and explains why he chose to pursue it rather than traditional Judaism. For one 
thing, the movement assigns authority to “present experience” rather than revealed 
law or tradition. Further, the new thinking relies heavily on a broader critique of 
reason and philosophy found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, a seminal thinker 
for Strauss (¶17). Unlike earlier efforts to make Judaism compelling by showing 
that “the truth of traditional Judaism is the religion of reason,” the new thinking 
rejected reason as a criterion altogether (¶15). The movement followed Nietzsche in 
arguing that the “return to Judaism requires today the overcoming of what one may 
call the perennial obstacle to the Jewish faith: traditional philosophy” (¶16). 
This critique of philosophy was based not only on its awareness of the limits of 
reason but also on its thoroughgoing historicism. Following Nietzsche, Rosenzweig 
argued that “the human soul has no unchangeable essence or limits but is essential 
historical” (¶20). This claim constitutes the core of historicism’s claim to wisdom. 
The historical dimension of all thought reveals previous claims to wisdom as 
defective. It allows us to understand previous thinkers better than they understood 
themselves. Historicism also provides a new approach to tradition: whereas the 
question of return was also seen as a return to the revealed law, the new thinking 
claims that we have always selected from the tradition according to the needs of our 
age; now we can and should do so consciously. 
According to the autobiographical account of the narrative, Strauss’s turn to 
the new thinking was motivated by his question of whether a “return to Jewish 
orthodoxy was not both possible and necessary” (¶24). Yet Strauss does not return 
to orthodoxy. Instead he launches an investigation of Spinoza’s critique of religion 
to see if there are grounds philosophically that prevent a return. The results of this 
investigation are less clear in terms of orthodoxy, but point instead to the continuing 
relevance of ancient philosophy. Like Socrates, who claims in the Apology that 
his lifelong philosophical quest began with his pious attempts to understand and 
verify the oracle of Delphi, Strauss frames his discovery of philosophy in terms 
of his pious effort to return to orthodoxy. Whereas Socrates had investigated the 
belief in the gods of the city, Strauss investigates the superstitions of his age, the 
belief in historicism under the guise of the “new thinking.” 
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The New Thinking 
Strauss begins with Martin Buber’s foray into the new thinking in I and Thou . 
Rather than begin with the tradition, he starts with “present experience,” which 
is more immediate and less doubtful. If we are open to an encounter with the 
divine, that is, if we have not dogmatically accepted the rationalism of Greek philosophy— 
the path that recognizes only “what man knows by himself ”—we may 
experience an absolute call that comes from outside of man and “goes against man’s 
grain,” suddenly becomes more compelling (¶16). This experience finds confirmation 
in the call of the prophets in the Bible. The prophets too have experienced the 
speechless “call” of God and, in response, offer a human interpretation. Prophecy, 
the speechless experience of the absolute, is in principle open to everyone. Our 
return depends on our experience of the absolute and our recognition of this same 
experience in the Bible. 
Buber’s analysis places great weight on our interpretation of the absolute divine 
experience. But which interpretation of this experience is the truest one? Cannot 
the experience be tampered with? Is not the experience itself determined by our historical 
conditions? Buber cannot answer these questions by using reason to judge 
because he assumes that reason necessarily undermines such an experience. To 
show us the danger that Buber’s position has invited, Strauss invents a dialogue 
between Buber and Heidegger regarding whether the prophets sought to challenge 
or affirm the people’s security. Although Buber would many years later consider 
Heidegger’s critique, during the 1930s no such dialogue was possible because 
“[a]t that time, Heidegger expressed his thought about revelation by silence or deed 
rather than by speech” (¶17). To create a dialogue between Heidegger and Buber, 
therefore, Strauss has to use later writings from each author that he could not have 
had access to during this period of his development. 17 The confrontation between 
Buber and Heidegger once again confounds our efforts to trace Strauss’s historical 
development. 
Strauss’s dialogue reveals that Heidegger has a “deeper understanding” of 
the meaning and implications of the new thinking (¶17). Heidegger claims that 
Buber’s interpretation of the absolute is merely wishful thinking. Indeed, against 
Buber’s assertion that the warnings of the prophets do not “go against our grain,” 
Heidegger shows that they merely confirm our wish for security, particularly the 
security of our moral judgments by providing a “supra-human support for justice” 
(¶18). Rather than dismiss philosophy, he identifies a goal shared by both ancient 
philosophy and biblical revelation to find or demonstrate “the security of justice.” 
The desire for justice is in turn related to the desire for the eternal, which does not 
come into being or pass away. But the new thinking exposes this desire as “stemming 
from ‘spirit of revenge’” rather than from either revelation or reason. Buber 
had dismissed reason with the confidence that revelation could take its place as 
the basis for justice. But Heidegger’s atheism cuts off this possibility and forces us 
to confront our terrifying condition of insecurity and uncertainty. For him, terror 
and cruelty are the true signs of “intellectual probity.” 18 There is no ultimate 
ground for its belief in a summum bonum ; philosophy can no longer pretend to be 
anything more than an act of will. 
Strauss presents Heidegger’s critique of revelation in terms of a critique of the 
high. In an unmistakable attack on Heidegger, he observes that “[n]ot every man 
but every noble man is concerned with justice and righteousness and therefore 
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with any possible or extra-human support of justice, or with the security of justice” 
(¶18). In Strauss’s presentation, Heidegger’s pursuit of justice takes the form of a 
demand for “intellectual probity,” which in turn attempts to expose every concern 
for justice with the desire for security. 19 Intellectual probity should not be confused 
with “the old love of truth.” 20 The difference, Strauss, explains, is that probity is 
more explicit, even dogmatic, about its atheism. As a result, it rejects all attempts to 
obscure the consequences of atheism, or to pretend that some sort of “semi-theism” 
is possible. 21 In Heidegger’s hands, liberalism’s neutrality regarding the high gives 
way to the explicit rejection of the transcendent and the apparent embrace of the 
low. Conversely, Strauss shows the common ground shared by reason and revelation, 
and in fact by all noble men, namely the concern for justice. Strauss’s return 
aims at restoring this common ground rather than showing the victory of one alternative. 
Of course, this personal attack does not mitigate the force of Heidegger’s 
objections. Instead, it exposes a deeper problem: modern philosophy, which began 
with a criticism of superstition in favor of reason, now abandons reason as a guide. 
The result is that philosophy participates in the superstitions that it had previously 
criticized and the cruelty that it had once abhorred. 22 
Strauss’s path of return moves from Heidegger toward the origins of modernity 
and Spinoza. 23 First, though, he considers a more serious attempt at a qualified 
return to the Bible offered by Franz Rosenzweig. Paradoxically, Rosenzweig begins 
his quest to return by denying the possibility of a return to Biblical faith. He draws 
a distinction between what the authors of the Bible meant and how we understand 
it today. The former is a historical concern characteristic of what he calls the “old 
thinking,” while the latter is practiced in full awareness of the historical text and 
our current situation, that is, how the text affects the present situation. It is important 
to note that Rosenzweig rejects Spinoza’s principle of selecting from the text 
by distinguishing between its essential and unessential parts. Such a distinction 
can hardly be as objective as it claims, since it presumes the wisdom that it seeks 
to find in the Bible. Rosenzweig avoids this problem by admitting that a “force” 
rather than a principle guides our decision. The past, the “whole reality of Jewish 
life,” offers materials for us to select and by virtue of the selection, transform into a 
living force in our lives. The past becomes a set of resources for building the future, 
but we are the ones who select from the past. 
But as we scrutinize Rosenzweig’s selections, we cannot help but notice that 
vitality is measured by consistency with modern liberal regimes. Thus, for example, 
Rosenzweig does not find compelling the orthodox view of the Torah’s law, 
which sees it in terms of prohibition and rejection; instead he interprets the law 
in terms of liberation and transformation. This represents a far more optimistic 
view of political possibilities and of the fate of liberal societies. Another example 
of vitality is Rosenzweig’s rejection of Biblical miracles. Here vitality is associated 
with skepticism and science. Rosenzweig claims he did not believe all the miracles 
reported in the Torah but, rather, claims to be open to belief. 24 The orthodox 
approach, in contrast, had far less confidence in the judgment of each individual 
not only because of the limits of reason but also because such individuality could 
undermine the cohesiveness of the community. 
Like Buber, Rosenzweig wishes to make Judaism more consistent with experience, 
but in practice this means making it more consistent with liberalism. 
Instead of beginning from the Torah as law, as does Maimonides, for example, 
Rosenzweig begins from one’s awareness of being a member of the chosen people, 
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because such awareness is “the primary condition of the possibility of Jewish 
consciousness” (¶21). This is at odds with the traditional view that the law as 
revealed is the basis of the community. Strauss suggests that Rosenzweig consciously 
begins with chosenness rather than law in order to reshape the tradition 
so that it is more compatible with Christianity. This is in keeping with Spinoza’s 
liberalism, where Judaism and Christianity are assimilated into a universal religion 
that stresses caritas as the sole requirement for salvation. Rosenzweig did 
not hope to return to traditional Judaism, but to adapt the tradition so that it 
would be at home in Weimar. Strauss exposes Rosenzweig’s effort to reshape the 
tradition, yet he does not criticize this reform simply as a betrayal of the tradition. 
Rather, he wonders how to take one’s bearing in such a project: how can one 
know that one’s proposals to change the tradition will result in its preservation 
or deepening? Has Rosenzweig understood “the old in its depth”? His attempt to 
transform Judaism in order to make it compatible with liberalism, a regime that 
is ambiguous with respect to a summum bonum , suggest otherwise. 25 By transforming 
Judaism to meet the needs of liberalism, Rosenzweig has lowered the 
tradition rather than deepened it. 
Strauss also suggests that Rosenzweig’s proffered reform has not deepened the 
tradition, by contrasting him with Maimonides, who similarly attempted to alter the 
tradition’s attitude toward philosophy. Curiously, Strauss approaches the superiority 
of Maimonides in terms of his method for reshaping the tradition. Maimonides 
was more loyal to the Jewish People, or at least more careful to preserve the appearance 
of his loyalty to the tradition, than was Rosenzweig. Nothing exemplifies 
this better than Maimonides insistence on placing Judaism above philosophy and 
politics. Strauss says that Maimonides, in sharp contrast to Rosenzweig, wrote 
Jewish books, not philosophical ones, “as a Jew he gives his assent where as a philosopher 
he would suspend his assent” (cf. Guide of the Perplexed 2.16; HBS xiv). 
In the preface, Strauss makes the same point in order to contrast Maimonides with 
Rosenzweig, He points out that [w]hereas the classic work of what is called Jewish 
medieval philosophy, the Guide of the Perplexed , is primarily not a philosophic 
book but a Jewish book, Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is primarily not a Jewish 
book but a “system of philosophy” (¶21). The difference between a Jewish book 
and a philosophic book is that in a Jewish book, the authority of law precedes and 
is distinguished from the authority of reason. 26 Rosenzweig, however, has already 
rejected both ancient philosophy and reason as a guide. To make matters worse 
from Strauss’s point of view, Rosenzweig’s philosophy is much more consistent 
with Christianity than is traditional Judaism because its starting point is not the 
law, but a secondary category like chosenness. In this sense, he treats the tradition 
as a quarry, or set of resources, for crafting a Judeo-Christian society. This view is 
important to keep in mind because Strauss will later call attention to Rosenzweig 
and Cohen’s critique of Spinoza, which essentially claims that he was disloyal to 
his people by exposing its flaws for all to see. In fact, Strauss here shows that 
Rosenzweig has essentially done the same thing, with even less consciousness of 
his debt to Spinoza. 
The Return to Spinoza 
The second half of Strauss’s preface (¶¶ 24–42) is devoted to Hermann Cohen’s 
analysis of Spinoza. This is surprising, insofar as Cohen predated Rosenzweig and 
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Buber. Moreover, his analysis stops short of the new thinking in that he holds reason 
in high esteem, capable of guiding men and teaching them a universal moral 
law consistent with Jewish law. Possibly Strauss was genuinely more impressed by 
Cohen than by Rosenzweig. He describes Cohen as “a Jew of rare dedication” who 
“symbolized more than anyone else the union of Jewish faith and German culture.” 
Nor did Cohen neglect the high. In fact, he “surpassed in spiritual power” his colleagues 
in philosophy and theology. However, we must be careful not to overstate 
the influence of Cohen’s critique; after all, Strauss largely rejects Cohen’s analysis 
of Spinoza. His tribute to Cohen is actually a refutation of Cohen’s approach to 
philosophy. Indeed, he raises the question of whether Cohen could even be considered 
a philosopher, suggesting instead that he is a rather limited, if well-meaning, 
scholar. 27 In short, his presentation of Cohen is from the point of view of the 
mature Strauss who has thoroughly rejected him. 28 
Yet Rosenzweig’s judgment on Cohen plays an important role in Strauss’s presentation. 
Rosenzweig admits that Cohen’s treatment of the evidence may not be 
just; however, Rosenzweig argues that there is a deeper justification for Cohen’s 
position. Spinoza took “for granted the philosophic detachment or freedom from 
the tradition of his own people” (¶35). Philosophy may appear to confer freedom 
by detaching one from the community, but this is an illusion on par with the 
erroneous view that reason provides a liberating vantage point. Rejecting such 
illusions, Rosenzweig claims that this detachment is nothing more than the 
rejection of loyalty, love, and sympathy for one’s own community. Had Spinoza 
cared more for his people, he would have helped them reinterpret their tradition 
“in light of the highest [possibility, or failing that,] if necessary, better than 
they understood themselves” (¶35). Thus, although the explicit topic of this 
section of the essay is how to read Spinoza (or how Cohen misread Spinoza), 
the judgment of Rosenzweig opens the radical question about changing a tradition. 
Cohen, who was temperamentally conservative, was unable to grasp, “the 
fact that the continuous and changing tradition . . . [depends on] revolutions and 
sacrileges” (¶38). 
As for Cohen’s critical reading of Spinoza, Strauss does show how Cohen helps 
expose several central and apparently deliberate contradictions in the TTP . These 
contradictions would reappear in Strauss’s mature interpretation of Spinoza; however, 
Cohen was unable to resolve them correctly because of his conviction that 
he has understood Spinoza better than Spinoza understood himself. This “idealizing 
interpretation” is a variety of historicism, which explains an author’s work 
as a product of history rather than deliberate choice. Cohen, for example, did not 
consider that Spinoza’s style reflected a deliberate choice in light of persecution 
and his political project. Strauss playfully and explicitly refutes this, and suggests 
instead that Cohen “understood Spinoza too literally because he didn’t understand 
him literally enough” (¶37). The difficulty in reading Spinoza correctly is determining 
whether he means what he says, that is, whether we should read him literally. 
The question of historical circumstances undoubtedly plays a role in Spinoza’s 
presentation, but in order to measure this influence, we must understand Spinoza’s 
metaphysical project. If Spinoza’s assertions contradict his metaphysical teaching, 
then we are justified in considering his political circumstances to explain his argument. 
29 Thus, Strauss’s section is meant to guide the reader away from his historicist 
prejudice to a more thoughtful reading of Spinoza. The claim of the overall 
narrative is that one can escape Spinoza’s theologico-political grip only by reading 
him correctly. 
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The Development of Strauss’s Interpretation of Spinoza 
In addressing Cohen’s historicist interpretation of Spinoza, Strauss begins by putting 
aside the autobiographical narrative to offer an account of Spinoza’s metaphysics 
(¶27). To see more clearly the defects in Cohen’s hermeneutics, Strauss begins 
with a literal reading of Spinoza’s political thought. According to this account, 
Spinoza must be understood as part of modern philosophy’s break with ancient 
philosophy. Spinoza did not initiate this break, but was “the heir of the modern 
revolt” (¶29). Modern philosophy rejected the theoretical contemplation of nature 
in favor of a more practical and useful approach. It sought to master rather than 
contemplate nature. This was part of a political project to improve man’s comfort 
and thereby secure the freedom to philosophize. Spinoza embraces the modern 
project, but also attempts to restore the “dignity of speculation on the basis of 
modern philosophy or science” (¶29). 
Spinoza’s metaphysical starting point is also distinctively modern: all things 
proceed from the one, but the process is not one of decay or descent, neither is it 
one of creation. Rather it is an unfolding of individual, particular things that we 
are to understand sub specie aeternatatis . 30 The “last word on the subject” is the 
Ethics , where Spinoza argues that the highest form of knowledge is of particular 
things. 31 In sharp contrast to the Bible, God is not therefore the highest source of 
knowledge, but the process or unfolding of nature. Thus, on the question of the 
high, Spinoza’s thought is ambiguous. On the one hand, he maintains the view of 
ancient philosophy that philosophy is the highest activity for man; on the other 
hand, his view is not grounded in nature but rather in the endless (and directionless) 
unfolding of nature. 
Spinoza’s political project, liberalism, reflects his ambiguity about the status of 
the high. He begins, or appears to begin, from metaphysical axioms that provide 
no basis or support for justice. 32 In fact, the goal of politics must be understood 
in light of the mechanical universe within which it operates. Rather than refer 
to intellectual or moral virtue, the regime must be directed toward security and 
comfort. Nor can political leaders rely on some absolute standard of justice (from 
nature or God) to fix their goal. They must guide man but rather by the toughminded 
control of destructive passions and the fostering of more constructive ones 
through, for example, a commercial society. Spinoza equates the passions with the 
right of nature, so as to indicate that they are natural, even if they are not directed 
toward any end other than the striving to persist. 
Cohen’s Critique of Spinoza 
The celebration of Spinoza by German Jews ref lects their appreciation of liberalism 
as a regime that offered them unprecedented opportunities. Spinoza was the 
saint who inaugurated “a new religion or religiousness which was to become a 
wholly new kind of society, a new kind of Church” (¶27). That they neglected 
the Machiavellian elements of his political thought and ignored his rejection 
of the Biblical God is not surprising given their apparent f lourishing in liberal 
democracy. To his credit, Cohen refused to ignore the less attractive elements of 
Spinoza’s teaching (¶29). He was particularly disturbed by the effort to annul the 
original excommunication, arguing instead that Spinoza had indeed betrayed the 
Jewish people. Cohen was not concerned, according to Strauss, with violations 
of ceremonial law or the denial of Mosaic authorship. Instead, he “condemned 
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Spinoza because of his infidelity in the simple human sense, of his complete lack 
of loyalty to his own people, of his acting like an enemy of the Jews and thus giving 
aid and comfort to the many enemies of the Jews, of his behaving like a base 
traitor” (¶19). 
Cohen’s particular charges constitute a damning indictment: Spinoza accepts 
and extends the Christian critique of Judaism. He falsely accuses Judaism of commanding 
hatred of the enemy. He presents a picture of Judaism as carnal and 
particularistic in contrast to the universal and spiritual picture of Christianity. His 
efforts to show Judaism in a poor light lead him to contradict himself by then claiming 
that prophecy is universal in order to promote the universalism of Christianity. 
In Spinoza’s version of Judaism, the law is particularly devalued as having a purely 
political, rather than moral or spiritual, role. Having reduced the law to a tribal 
code, Spinoza suggests that the law’s author, the God of Israel, is merely a tribal 
God. Not only then does Spinoza betray the Jewish people, he also blasphemes God 
while suggesting that the Torah is “of merely human origin” (¶18). 
In Cohen’s reading, Spinoza is so filled with malice—“he has no heart for the 
people, no compassion”—that he grows obsessed with denigrating Judaism by any 
means necessary (¶30). He does not hesitate, for instance, to praise Christianity or 
encourage the anti-Jewish views of his Christian readers. He ignores contradictions 
in his own argument if they undermine Judaism. His betrayal of his people and 
philosophy is “humanly incomprehensible” and even demonic in that it is rooted in 
a denial of any standard of morality. Cohen also argues that there was a more comprehensible 
motive for Spinoza’s hostility toward Judaism. Like other Marranos, 
whose fear of the Inquisition turned into hatred of its causes, namely Judaism, 
Spinoza aimed his hatred at the victims rather than the perpetrators. 
Strauss agrees with Cohen’s overall judgment that Spinoza is “amazingly 
unscrupulous”; indeed, he argues that his own judgment is “in some ways even 
stronger than Cohen’s” (¶31). But Cohen reads the TTP too literally and therefore 
mistakenly thinks that Spinoza genuinely prefers Christianity to Judaism 
because it appears more spiritual and universal. In his view, Spinoza wishes to 
ennoble Christianity by convincing Christians to purge themselves of carnal relics 
of Judaism, that is, by liberating Christianity from Judaism. This is where “Cohen 
fails” to follow Spinoza’s argument. 33 Spinoza’s goal according to Strauss was to 
fashion a liberal society that embraced the freedom to philosophy. The argument 
that he crafted was not a betrayal of the Jewish people, nor does his primary allegiance 
to philosophy mean that he is indifferent to the Jewish people. 34 To the 
contrary, Spinoza provides a society wherein they could be citizens. In addition, 
the universal dogmas of catholic faith in TTP Chapter 14 “are equally acceptable 
to both Jews and Christians” (¶31). Such a society requires the abrogation of the 
Mosaic law, but this law had become obsolete with the destruction of the state. 
Strauss’s defense of Spinoza amounts to this: he “liberated Jews in the only way he 
could think of ” given his philosophy (¶31). 
Strauss’s critique of Spinoza is stronger than Cohen’s because Strauss does not 
ignore the Machiavellian core of Spinoza’s project. Cohen was committed to a 
theologico-political view that combined the Bible with Kant, who viewed God as 
an “idea” that guarantees the existence of a universal moral law discoverable by reason. 
The “idea” of God is the basis of morality, as well as of the optimistic belief in 
the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil. 35 Kant’s moral law is realizable first only 
in particular states, but it points toward a universal moral order, grounded in international 
law and enforced by a league of nations. In Cohen’s version of creation and 
 
9781137324382_04_cha02.indd 46 10/30/2013 7:07:38 PM 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion ● 47 
providence, the politics generates the theology. In other words, we need the “idea” 
of God to justify a certain political order. Reason comes to theology’s aid to help 
determine the requirements of a universal and just political order, and instructs 
theology on its presuppositions. 
But all of these beliefs are exposed as superstitions, albeit salutary superstitions, 
within the confines of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Cohen’s thought and his interpretation 
of Spinoza have a clear sense of the high, and he seeks wherever possible to read 
the low in light of the high. According to Strauss, this leads to various problems 
within Cohen’s own thought. For example, he tends to cover over the criminal 
violence and destruction that attend revolutions. Similarly, he sees the purpose 
of punishment solely in terms of promoting the well-being of the criminal. In his 
single-minded attention to the high, Cohen appears to ignore the low altogether. 
He “ignored the harsh political verities which Spinoza had stated so forcefully” 
(¶36). In this, one wonders whether he did not help to prepare the generation of 
Jews who did not have “eyes to see” the disaster that was approaching. In any case, 
this tendency to neglect the low renders Cohen a woefully inadequate interpreter 
of Spinoza because “the kind of interpretation which Spinoza calls for is not idealizing, 
since his own doctrine is not idealistic” (¶36). 
Strauss focuses our attention on two related problems in Cohen’s interpretation 
that expose the problem that emerges with his idealizing philosophy. First, Cohen is 
unable to conceive of the relation between reason and revelation as anything other 
than harmonious. In addition, Cohen cannot grasp the meaning of Spinoza’s denial 
of any natural support for the high. Both examples point us directly to Maimonides 
and imply that not only did Cohen misinterpret Spinoza and Maimonides incorrectly 
but also that Maimonides’s point of view was superior. 
Cohen claims that Spinoza’s interpretation of Judaism does not recognize 
the universalism of the prophets. For instance, Spinoza draws our attention to 
Maimonides’s claim that a person cannot be saved unless he believes in Mosaic revelation. 
This view suggests that obedience rather than reason is primary to piety. 
Similarly, Maimonides claims that a non-Jew can be considered pious if he performs 
the Noahide commandments as commandments of God, adding that if a 
non-Jew performs them because they are rational, he is neither pious nor wise. Its 
wisdom teaches that reason cannot supplant piety as a source of political authority. 
Finally, Maimonides suggests that the Torah’s commandments themselves are 
not rational, but are meant to address and cure idolatry, “an irrational practice.” 
Maimonides begins from the opinions of the community before determining the 
best way to enlighten the tradition. Irrational opinions may justify the commandments 
while reason itself may not. 36 Leaving aside Spinoza, Strauss reports that the 
Jewish tradition, as per Joseph Caro, confirms this view. Cohen ignores those elements 
of the Jewish tradition, which suggests a tension between wisdom and piety 
because he overestimates the power of reason and its compatibility with the law. 
The other example that Strauss chooses focuses on the question of the highest 
good. Cohen points out the following contradiction in the TTP : Spinoza claims 
that Moses’ law is a divine law, that is, it points man toward the highest good or 
intellectual love of God; yet, he denies that the Mosaic law aims at the highest 
good. Strauss denies that this is a contradiction, because Spinoza does not mean 
the law is divine in the sense of aiming toward salvation or even intellectual knowledge 
of God. Rather, Spinoza means that the law is divine because it is believed to 
be divine by Christian readers whom Spinoza addresses. There is no divine law in 
the sense of a law with natural or rational ends. Cohen has not come to grips with 
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the fact that neither God nor reason supports the moral law. Spinoza’s morality 
is always tied to a relentless egoism. Following his teacher Machiavelli, Spinoza 
conceives of nature in terms of individuals struggling to persist in their own being. 
Nothing stands apart from or above this struggle that would allow us to judge it 
in moral terms. 
Cohen wants to understand the tradition as something that we can shape by 
understanding the low or superstitious in light of reason, or the high. Despite 
Strauss’s insistence on understanding the low in light of the high, he rejects 
Cohen’s reading of the Jewish tradition. The reason for this is that Cohen has 
not escaped the horizons set out by Spinoza. He “does not come to grips with the 
fact that Spinoza’s critique is directed against the whole body” of Jewish teachings 
and tradition (¶39). He believed that Spinoza had refuted orthodoxy, especially 
miracles and law. Furthermore, Cohen agrees with Spinoza’s opposition to rabbinical 
Judaism, which put great emphasis on ceremonial law. Modern Judaism has 
liberated itself from the rabbinical view of law. Cohen’s understanding of Judaism, 
by virtue of which he attacks Spinoza, is grounded in the “historical understanding 
of the Bible,” which in fact was originated by Spinoza. Cohen recognizes that 
his understanding of Judaism, for example, his distinction between mythical and 
historical elements of the Bible, is not consistent with “our traditional exegesis.” In 
short, Cohen offers a more positive view of Judaism as rational, but ultimately his 
understanding of Torah is consistent with, and rests on Spinoza. Cohen’s attempt 
to understand Spinoza better than he understood himself failed; in fact, Spinoza 
understood Cohen better than Cohen understood himself. 
Strauss’s Judgment on Spinoza 
Strauss concludes the Preface by summarizing his argument in SCR on the consequences 
of Spinoza’s critique of religion. Spinoza claims to refute orthodoxy, and 
its particular claims about the divine inspiration of every word of the Bible, that 
Moses was the author of the Torah, the account of miracles as violations of natural 
law, etc. The TTP did succeed in refuting orthodoxy, but only if orthodoxy makes 
claims that it cannot defend. But if Orthodoxy responds by making less ambitious 
claims, for example, by admitting that such claims “cannot claim to possess the 
binding power peculiar to the known,” than Spinoza has not refuted orthodoxy 
(¶40). Biblical religion ultimately rests on the claim that God’s will is unfathomable. 
This is the premise by which all orthodox claims are possible. 
Spinoza has succeeded only in showing that there are contradictions in the 
Biblical narrative but this only undermines an overly ambitious variety of orthodoxy, 
which claims paradoxically to know the ways of God. Traditional Judaism, 
however, makes no such claims and thus “cannot be refuted by experience or by 
recourse to the principle of contradiction” (¶40). Spinoza was forced to overreach 
by claiming to know more than he could about the whole of things, and he had 
resort to mockery and ridicule in the place of argument to unseat religion. This 
reveals his critique as fundamentally resting on an act of will or a decision rather 
than reason. By exposing the defects of Spinoza’s critique, Strauss does not mean to 
suggest that orthodoxy has triumphed over philosophy. Rather, he wishes to show 
the defects inherent in the Enlightenment’s political project, which leaves men 
freedom without guidance. The “self-destruction of reason” in modernity invites 
another kind of return, a return to a preliberal thought. Such a return requires an 
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investigation into method by which “heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their 
books” (¶42). 
Conclusion: Progress or Return? 
As we have seen, Strauss presents an autobiographical account meant to explain the 
development of his understanding of Spinoza in the Preface to the translation of 
his first book on Spinoza. But a careful examination of the Preface reveals the fact 
that Strauss is neither explaining the development of his thought, nor simply giving 
an account of his life as a young man. This becomes clear when we pay attention, 
for example, to the fact that Strauss’s mature judgments guide his presentation of 
the autobiographical materials. His assertion that it is safer to understand the low 
in light of the high is particularly important in this regard. But what does Strauss 
mean by the “high”? Strauss forces the reader to puzzle out this critical question, 
which is the key to understanding the essay. 
Instead of identifying the meaning of the “high,” he provides an account of his 
efforts to escape “the grips of the theologico-political predicament” bequeathed to 
modernity by Spinoza. This escape or liberation initially takes the form of return, 
particularly a return to revelation. But this attempt to return proves exceptionally 
difficult because Spinoza’s critique of revelation profoundly shapes the way 
subsequent thinkers understand the tradition. Significantly, Spinoza is ambiguous 
about the source and meaning of “the high”; specifically, he is unclear whether the 
divine law is in some sense true or whether it is merely the product of superstition. 
This ambiguity allows for a variety of readings of Spinoza, which were pursued by 
Strauss’s community in Germany. The more optimistic interpretation affirmed the 
divine foundation of morality, while others took Spinoza’s atheism as corroborating 
the new virtue of “intellectual probity.” Neither view, however, managed fully to 
escape Spinoza’s grip and appreciate the possibility of return. Strauss suggests that 
the liberation from Spinoza is possible if we read Spinoza carefully, that is, if we 
understand his political project, including his ambiguous treatment of the high, 
in light of his metaphysics that denies the possibility of the high. In other words, 
the political project must be understood as an attempt to obscure Spinoza’s view of 
nature, which is entirely indifferent to human flourishing. 
To liberate oneself from the grip of Spinoza means to understand his project 
and also to recognize an alternative to his metaphysical and political views. Strauss 
suggests that this is possible because Spinoza has not succeeded in refuting revelation. 
“The genuine refutation of orthodoxy would require the proof that the world 
and human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a mysterious 
God. . . . [M]an has to show himself theoretically and practically as the master of 
the world and the master of life” (¶40). Spinoza has not done this; instead, in his 
attempt to do so he has overstated the capacity of reason to provide a full account of 
the whole and thereby rendered it questionable as a rational activity. To the clearsighted 
descendants of Spinoza, philosophy appears to be the result not of rational 
inquiry, but an act of will. This permits the provisional triumph of orthodoxy, but 
without reason. Invariably, orthodoxy descends into fanaticism. Strauss envisions 
a “return” to a piety that is checked by reason, and a philosophy that is mindful 
of its limitations. Thus the restoration of the “high” requires the simultaneous 
recovery of reason and revelation as potential candidates for the best life. Nor is 
the possibility of such a recovery a matter for despair. Since we have the important 
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works of medieval and ancient philosophy, we need only to excavate how such 
issues appeared to thinkers before Spinoza. In teaching us to read Spinoza carefully, 
Strauss also teaches us to read his predecessors carefully. 
Since Strauss himself was not an observant Jew, it is easy to conclude that philosophy 
has, in his eyes, already ultimately overcome revelation in its claims to the 
high. 37 In fact, Strauss appears to say as much: “Philosophy or science, the highest 
activity of man, is the attempt to replace opinion about ‘all things’ by knowledge 
of ‘all things’; but opinion is the element of society; philosophy or science is the 
attempt to dissolve the element in which society breathes, and thus it endangers 
society.” The result is that philosophy “must respect the opinions on which society 
rests” without “accepting them as true.” 38 Thus, even if we attribute to Strauss 
the view that philosophy is the highest or best activity for man, we cannot avoid 
the political problem of accommodating this view to our community, which rests 
on a settled standard of justice. This tension between conventional opinion and 
philosophy resembles the Platonic cave. Yet this tension has been entirely obscured 
by modern philosophy, as exemplified in Spinoza’s metaphysics, which claims that 
nature offers no support to either reason or revelation. In this sense, believers and 
philosophers are in the same predicament: in order to restore a sense of the high, 
they must first liberate themselves from the cave beneath the cave. 39 
 
Notes 
* Strauss published two editions of the autobiographical preface: the first as a preface 
to the translation of SCR and the second as part of a collection of essays in LAM . The 
two versions are nearly identical except that in the latter version Strauss divides several 
of the longer paragraphs into shorter ones so that where there are 42 paragraphs in the 
original essay, while there are 54 paragraphs in the later edition. Another important 
difference is that in the later edition, Strauss refers to himself as being in the “grips” 
of a theologico-political problem. This change, from “grip” is discussed below (see 
note 22). This essay uses the paragraph numbering from the original essay in SCR . My 
thanks to Professors Terence Marshall, Thomas Meyer, Richard Polt, Timothy Sean 
Quinn, John Ray, and Martin D. Yaffe for their thoughtful comments (and objections) 
to this essay. 
1 . Strauss’s letter to Kr ü ger is dated January 7, 1930 ( GS–3 380–81). He blames his “boss,” 
Julius Guttmann, for preventing him from writing more explicitly. For an overview of 
the correspondence between Kr ü ger and Strauss, see Thomas L. Pangle, “Light Shed 
on the Crucial Development of Strauss’s Thought by his Correspondence with Gerhard 
Kr ü ger,” chapter 3 of the present volume. 
2 . One of Strauss’s central hermeneutical principles is that careful authors have developed 
their own manner of writing by studying other careful writers. In general, therefore, 
“we learn to write by reading. A man learns to write well by reading well good books, 
by reading well most carefully books which are carefully written” ( PAW 144). Strauss’s 
commentaries on philosophical texts offer guidelines for reading carefully. One method 
that he frequently employs, for example, is counting the number of paragraphs to determine 
the central paragraph (cf. PAW 24–25). 
3 . A good example of this is David Janssens’s fine study, Between Athens and Jerusalem: 
Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss’s Early Thought (Albany: SUNY Press 
2008), 8–26. Janssens begins by attempting to follow Strauss’s preface as an account of 
his early thought, but is quickly forced to cite other materials and sources to fill in the 
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picture even to explain the meaning of Strauss’s description of the “theological-political 
predicament.” 
4 . The original essay indicated that Strauss was in the “grip” of the theologico-political 
predicament. Strauss decided to make “grip” plural in the subsequent edition. His 
choice may reflect the fact that he believed the theologico-political predicament had 
multiple sources and expressions. I wish to thank Thomas Meyer for directing me to 
this difference and its possible meaning. 
5 . For a more extended analysis of the theologico-political predicament, see my “Politics 
and Rhetoric: The Intended Audience of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ,” 
Review of Metaphysics 52 (1998–99): 897–924. 
6 . See my “Review Essay of Martin D. Yaffe’s translation and commentary of Spinoza’s 
Tractatus ,” Interpretation 32, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 171–78. 
7 . Spinoza also hoped to mitigate the damage done by theology, by creating a universal 
faith whose only requirement was the practice of charity. In addition, he prescribed 
political institutions based on power rather than theology, which were more consistent 
with the natural asocial nature of man. Finally, by liberating philosophy from politics 
and theology, he enlisted the help of science in promoting the well-being of the 
citizens. 
8 . Spinoza “was the philosopher who founded liberal democracy, a specifically modern 
regime” (¶27). 
9 . Allan Arkush, “Leo Strauss and Jewish Modernity,” in Leo Strauss and Judaism: 
Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1996), 115. 
10 . See Steven Smith, “How to Commemorate the 350th Anniversary of Spinoza’s 
Expulsion,” Hebraic Political Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 173. 
11 . Emil Fackenheim also identifies this passage as critical to understanding Strauss, 
but Fackenheim thinks that Strauss has not fully confronted the low as revealed in 
the Holocaust. See his “Leo Strauss and Modern Judaism,” in Emil Fackenheim, 
Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy , ed. Michael Morgan (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1996), 103, 104. 
12 . Contrast this position with Hannah Arendt’s critique of Zionism. After the war, 
Strauss continued to defend Israel on the grounds that it restored national pride 
(see his letter to National Review in JPCM 413–14.). The preface was written in 
August 1962, less than 3 months after Eichmann was hung in Jerusalem. Strauss’s 
endorsement of Zionism on the grounds of restoring Jewish pride stands in sharp 
contrast to Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem , written during the same period. 
13 . See TTP , chapter IV. 
14 . Strauss explains in his 1959 Spinoza seminar: Spinoza insists that “[w]e must go 
back to the Scriptures. And this Scripture is the document of revealed truth, and 
forget everything which the theologians claim to know. And in that moment—up 
to this point he says, by implication, there is only one authority: the word of God as 
delivered in the Bible. Then he turns it around. We must even examine the authority 
of the Bible. . . . That the Bible itself is true and divine cannot be assumed. It 
must be found out. Perhaps it is not true and divine, or is only partly true and 
divine. Therefore, to repeat, the argument of this work is ambiguous throughout. 
There is a Biblicist argument, based on the accepted authority of the Bible, but 
only of the Bible, as the word of God, and there is another argument which questions 
this very premise. The real teaching of Spinoza is not the Biblicist argument, 
but the other one” (29). 
15 . After quoting this passage, Strauss observes that the dogmas of universal piety 
“must be of such a kind that all moral men, all decent men, regardless of whether 
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they are Confucians or Christians, or Greek pagans for example, would never 
disagree. But this must somehow be in accordance with the Bible. That is the 
difficulty. The dogmas must be acceptable to all decent men. Now I hope the philosophers 
are decent men. Must they not also be dogmas which are acceptable to 
the philosophers? And philosophers according to Spinoza cannot believe in a legislating 
God, in a God who exercises providence. That’s the problem. . . . after having 
said that the Bible demands nothing but charity, meaning love of neighbor—therefore, 
opinions are free. But Spinoza knows that this principle . . . necessarily has 
theoretical premises. . . . If that is so, the denial of these theoretical principles must 
be prevented. And if the philosophers by definition deny these principles, the philosophers 
must be persecuted” (Lecture 9, p. 172). The solution, Strauss suggests, 
is that philosophers must pay lip-service to the essential dogmas, even if they do 
not believe in them (cf. 176–77). 
16 . See PAW 193–96. 
17 . Richard Velkley shows how Strauss’s thought acquired a “renewed and deeper 
engagement with Heidegger in the 1950s as Strauss acquired the publications of 
[Heidegger’s] later thought.” See Heidegger, Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 69. 
18 . See Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human , sec. 120 and 227. 
19 . “Heidegger’s political engagements show that the furthering of [the renewal of the 
question of being] takes precedence over any considerations of the good, the moral, 
and the just, as these have been understood in the philosophic tradition as having 
some universal articulation, reflecting ends (happiness, perfection, virtue) inherent 
in human nature or reason” in Velkley, Heidegger , 93. 
20 . See PLA 137–38 (endnote 13). 
21 . Ibid. 
22 . Strauss makes this point quite sharply in WIPP 26–27: “The crucial issue concerns 
the status of those permanent characteristics of humanity, such as the distinction 
between the noble and the base.” He goes on to associate the neglect of these 
characteristics with Heidegger: “It was the contempt for these permanencies which 
permitted the most radical historicist in 1933 to submit to, or rather to welcome, 
as a dispensation of fate, the verdict of the least wise and least moderate part of his 
nation which it was in its least wise and least moderate mood, and at the same time 
to speak of wisdom and moderation. The biggest even of 1933 would rather seem 
to have proved, if such a proof was necessary, that man cannot abandon the question 
of the good society, and that he cannot free himself from the responsibility of 
answering it by deferring to history or to any other power different from his own 
reason.” 
23 . Strauss will argue that “the ultimate justification of Spinoza’s critique is the atheism 
from intellectual probity, which overcomes orthodoxy radically by understanding 
it radically, i.e., without the polemical bitterness of the Enlightenment and the 
equivocal reverence of romanticism” (¶39). 
24 . Buber and Rosenzweig did not succeed in preserving the substance of the Jewish 
tradition. Their strategy, which Strauss describes in Philosophy and Law as “internalization,” 
manages to reinterpret the claims of the Jewish tradition (e.g., creation, 
miracles, revelation, and prophecy) so that they would no longer conflict 
with “intellectual probity.” For a lucid outline of Philosophy and Law , see Eve Adler, 
“Translator’s Introduction,” PLA 1–20. 
25 . Hobbes is less ambiguous and therefore more revealing than Spinoza on the question 
of the greatest good. See Leviathan , chapter 11 . 
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26 . As Hillel Fradkin points out: “there are according to Maimonides different sciences 
of the law, or more precisely two: the legalistic science of the law or jurisprudence 
and the true science of the law. The Guide is devoted to the latter.” See 
Fradkin, “A Word Fitly Spoken: The Interpretation of Maimonides in the legacy 
of Leo Strauss,” Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David 
Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 59. 
27 . “Cohen commits the typical mistake of the conservative, which consists in concealing 
the fact that the continuous and changing tradition . . . [depends on] revolutions 
and sacrileges” (¶38). By “conservative,” Strauss does not mean politically 
conservative. (Cohen’s left-wing political views, including his endorsement of 
socialism and his hostility to capital punishment, are well known.) Rather, Strauss 
means by “conservative” a strong orientation toward preserving the tradition that 
precludes questioning and challenging it. 
28 . As Strauss admits in 1972, it had been many decades since he had read Cohen seriously: 
“I grew up in an environment in which Cohen was the center of attraction 
for philosophically minded Jews who were devoted to Judaism; he was the master 
whom they revered. But it is more than forty years since I last studied or even read 
the Religion of Reason , and within the last twenty years I have only from time to 
time read or looked into some of his other writings.” See “Introductory Essay to 
Hermann Cohen,” JPCM 267. 
29 . This also explains a host of apparent contradictions in Strauss’s explanation of 
Spinoza. For example, Strauss says that the Ethics is the first and last word of 
Spinoza, but he praises Cohen for beginning with the TTP , which he says is more 
revealing. 
30 . See Richard Kennington, “Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza’s Ethics ,” in 
On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy , ed. Pamela Kraus and Frank 
Hunt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 205–28. For an extended discussion 
of Kennington’s argument, see Joshua Parens, Maimonides and Spinoza: Their 
Conflicting Views of Human Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 
193–212. 
31 . But Strauss praises Cohen for focusing his study on Spinoza’s TTP rather than 
the Ethics , a method that Strauss himself follows in his own writing and teaching 
(¶39). In his seminar on Spinoza in 1959 at the University of Chicago, for example, 
Strauss promises to turn to the Ethics after reading the TTP and the Political 
Treatise , but does not do so. 
32 . The ambivalence runs throughout Spinoza’s critique of the Bible. Spinoza wishes 
to use the Bible to establish a liberal society, which in turn, calls into question the 
very foundations of that society. As Strauss wrote in his 1936 study of Hobbes: 
“Exactly as a Spinoza did later, Hobbes becomes an interpreter of the Bible . . . to 
make use of the authority of Scriptures for his own theory, and then . . . to shake the 
authority of Scriptures themselves.” Cited in Leora Batnitzky, “Leo Strauss and the 
‘Theologico-Political Predicament,’” in The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss , 
ed. Steven B. Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47. 
33 . In PAW 187, after claiming that Spinoza deliberately contradicts himself and that 
we should always resolve these contradictions by accepting the “the statement most 
opposed to what Spinoza considered the vulgar view,” Strauss says that “[o]nly 
by following this rule can we understand Spinoza’s thought exactly as he himself 
understood it and avoid the danger of becoming or remaining the dupes of his 
accommodations.” Here Harry Wolfson takes the place of Cohen as an author who 
explains Spinoza’s contradictions with historical reasons, that is, reasons “primarily 
AQ: Please 
note that 
as JPCM 
is given 
in the list 
of abbreviations 
in the 
Prelims it 
was left 
as is here. 
Please 
confirm 
if this is 
okay. 
9781137324382_04_cha02.indd 53 10/30/2013 7:07:39 PM 
54 ● Steven Frankel 
based, not on Spinoza’s explicit statements, but on the history of the author’s life.” 
Wolfson “admits that he is trying to understand Spinoza better than he understood 
himself ” ( PAW 188). 
34 . “[T]he Treatise is linked to its time, not because Spinoza’s serious or private 
thought was determined by his ‘historical situation’ without his being aware of 
it, but because he consciously and deliberately adapted, not his thought, but the 
public expression of his thought, to what his time demanded or permitted. His plea 
for ‘the freedom of philosophizing,’ and therefore for ‘the separation of philosophy 
from theology,’ is linked to its time in the first place because the time lacked that 
freedom and simultaneously offered reasonable prospects for its establishment” 
( PAW 192). 
35 . See also “Introductory Essay to Hermann Cohen,” JPCM 280: Cohen’s “‘optimism’ 
was too strong.” 
36 . On the importance of the distinction between wisdom and piety in Maimonides, 
see Raymond Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics: The Encounter of Philosophic and Religious 
Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
37 . This is Werner Dannhauser’s argument in “Athens and Jerusalem or Jerusalem 
and Athens” in Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Revisited , ed. David 
Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 155–71. See Hilail Gildin’s 
useful rejoinder, “D é j à Jew All Over Again: Dannhauser on Leo Strauss and 
Atheism,” Interpretation 25, no. 1 (Fall 1997): 125–33. 
38 . See “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” in WIPP 221–22. 
39 . Philosophy may not disagree with Spinoza’s conclusions as much as his presentation 
of those conclusions. In his essay on Kurt Riezler, Strauss presents a disagreement 
between Socrates and Thucydides on whether the high is supported by 
nature, or whether it is vulnerable precisely because it lacks support. Thucydides 
appears to deny the existence of such support, but nonetheless is not indifferent to 
its existence. See “Kurt Riezler,” WIPP 260. 
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